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 Abstract 
Economic job search theory offers two complementary predictions about the effects 
of unemployment benefits on job search outcomes among unemployed workers. By 
raising workers’ reservation wages, unemployment benefits should contribute to both 
prolonged spell duration and improved post-unemployment job quality.  
In contrast to many previous empirical studies that have addressed the negative 
benefit effect on duration only, the current paper jointly addresses the causal effect of 
unemployment benefits on both unemployment duration and post-unemployment job 
quality. Based on discrete-time event history methods and U.S. and German panel 
data for the 1980s and 1990s, the paper establishes empirical support for both types 
of benefit effects in both countries. Hence, the effect of unemployment benefits on 
employment careers is more appropriately described as career stabilization induced 
by welfare state provision of job search resources. Against some prolongation of 
unemployment spells, unemployment benefits effectively enable workers to maintain 
previously accumulated human capital by fostering adequate reemployment in terms 
of earnings, occupations, or job duration. Consistent with this view, unemployment 
benefits turn out as particularly effective in preventing severe losses in post-
unemployment job quality, but also in terms of maintaining job qua lity among high-
skill workers. Through these effects of benefits on job histories, cross-national 
differences in welfare state generosity also assume an important role in explaining 
U.S.-German differences in terms of unemployment dynamics. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die ökonomische Suchtheorie macht zwei komplementäre Vorhersagen über die 
Einflüsse auf die Dynamik von Arbeitslosigkeit, die aus den Ansprüchen an die 
Arbeitslosenversicherung erwachsen. Wenn die Anspruchslöhne bei Arbeitnehmern 
angehoben werden, ist davon auszugehen, daß die daraus erwachsenden 
Ansprüche an die Arbeitslosenversicherung zu einer verlängerten Dauer der 
Arbeitslosigkeit und zu einer besseren Qualität der anschließenden Beschäftigung 
beitragen.  
Im Gegensatz zu vielen bisherigen empirischen Studien, die nur den negativen Effekt 
der Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit betrachten, wird in diese Analyse der kausale 
Zusammenhang der Ansprüche an die Arbeitslosenversicherung sowohl auf die 
Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit als auch auf die Qualität der an die Arbeitslosigkeit 
anschließenden Beschäftigung einbezogen. Auf der Basis ereignisanalytischer 
Modellschätzungen und amerikanischer bzw. deutscher Paneldaten für die 80er und 
90er Jahre werden beide Effekte, die durch die Ansprüche an die 
Arbeitslosenversicherung ausgelöst werden, empirisch nachgewiesen. Der Effekt, 
den diese Ansprüche auf den weiteren Beschäftigungsverlauf haben, lässt sich 
angemessener beschreiben als die Stabilisierung von Erwerbsverläufen, erzielt durch 
wohlfahrtsstaatliche Transferleistungen zugunsten einer Stärkung der Ressourcen 
bei der Suche nach einer neuen Beschäftigung. Trotz einer gewissen Verlängerung 
der Dauer von Arbeitslosigkeit fördern die Unterstützungszahlungen während der 
Arbeitslosigkeit die Arbeitnehmer eindeutig bei der Erhaltung früher erworbenen 
Humankapitals, indem sie eine adäquate (bzgl. Einkommen, Tätigkeiten, 
Beschäftigungsdauer) Wiederbeschäftigung begünstigen.  
Passend zu dieser Sichtweise läßt sich feststellen, daß die aus der Arbeitslosigkeit 
herrührenden finanziellen Transferzahlungen besonders geeignet sind, tiefgreifende 
Verschlechterungen bei einer der Arbeitslosigkeit folgenden Beschäftigung zu 
vermeiden; gleiches gilt bezüglich der Erhaltung der Qualifikation von 
Hochqualifizierten. Im Zusammenhang mit diesen Auswirkungen auf die 
Beschäftigungsverläufe erklären die - hinsichtlich der Großzügigkeit der 
wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Regelungen - bestehenden Unterschiede in Deutschland und 
den USA in erheblichem Maße die Unterschiede bei den Arbeitslosigkeitsdynamiken 
in beiden Ländern. 
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Introduction 
 
The welfare state is a historically unprecedented achievement regulating 
economic life in modern societies. All modern welfare states seek to guarantee 
competitive product markets, maintain regulatory minimum standards in labor 
markets, and, most importantly for sociological analyses, seek to provide 
material security to individuals affected by economic hardship. Through different 
kinds of entitlements, benefits and transfers that compensate individuals for 
different life-course risks, welfare states in fact provide substantial financial 
buffers against adverse consequences of events like unemployment, ill health, 
or old age, which also contribute to reduce income fluctuations and economic 
inequalities within modern societies more generally (e.g. Rainwater et al. 1986; 
Mitchell 1991; McFate 1995; DiPrete and McManus 1996, 2000; McManus and 
DiPrete 2000; Gallie and Paugam 2000). 
While a by now substantial body of research documents such economic 
stabilization effects working directly through welfare state transfers in the short-
run, there is much less evidence on more indirect welfare state effects on labor 
market behavior and individual job histories in the longer run. Hence while 
sociologists have extensively studied the stratification of labor market careers 
(e.g. Logan 1996; Eliason 1995; Kalleberg and Mastekaasa 1998), the relation 
between structural change and individual job histories (DiPrete 1993; DiPrete 
and Nonnemaker 1997; DiPrete et al. 1997), but also the role of institutional 
differences in education and training systems (cf. Müller and Shavit 1998; 
Kerckhoff 1995; Allmendinger 1989), the discipline has so far been fairly silent 
on potential relationships between welfare state policies and labor market 
careers. Only recently, studies like Stier et al. (2001) have attempted to provide 
direct evidence of effects of family policy on female labor force participation, 
papers compiled in Gallie and Paugam (2000) have assessed cross-national 
differences in unemployment dynamics in different welfare state regimes, and 
DiPrete et al. (2001) have addressed the relationship between labor market 
regulation and the structure of labor market dynamics in Sweden and France. 
DiPrete et al. (2001) in particular have also stressed the necessity to evaluate 
the effects of welfare state institutions with longitudinal micro data, as several of 
their predictions about the structure of labor markets as deduced from the 
current macrosociological welfare state literature have not been borne out by 
their micro data in the case of France. 
In contrast to the paucity of respective research in sociology, studies 
interested in the relation between welfare state policies and labor markets have 
been regularly conducted in economics, on both the macro, but increasingly 
also on the micro level of individual workers. Based on job search theory and its 
derivatives, mainstream economists have in fact adopted a fairly critical view on 
the interaction between welfare states and labor markets. In particular with 
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respect to the core welfare state functions of providing transfers in order to 
compensate for current income losses, economists have been likely to point out 
potential disincentive effects of doing so. Upon closer inspection, however, it 
seems that many economists tend to misrepresent the basic predictions of their 
own models. Rather than simply inducing worker slackness and reduced search 
efforts, most basic job search theory predicts that by raising workers’ 
reservation wages, the additional unemployment duration induced by welfare 
state transfers will be productive insofar as it is supposed lead to increases in 
post-unemployment job quality. Burdett (1979) has referred to this effect by 
seeing welfare state transfers as a search subsidy, allowing workers to sustain 
the potentially more difficult search for relatively more adequate jobs over some 
period of time. If respective transfer effects were established empirically, a more 
appropriate view of the relation between welfare states and labor markets would 
actually be that welfare states’ stabilizing effects do not only pertain to income 
fluctuations in the short run, but also encompass more long-term effects in the 
sense of stabilizing individual employment careers more generally. If so, then 
cross-national differences in welfare state policies are also likely to assume a 
much more prominent role in explaining cross-national differences in labor 
market dynamics than currently assumed in most stratification studies. 
Against this background, the current paper uses U.S. and German panel 
data to empirically assess the nature and magnitudes of unemployment benefit 
effects on employment careers. As welfare states in the U.S. and Germany 
differ considerably in terms of the generosity of their UI systems, the 
comparative analyses will additionally allow to address whether and how UI 
benefit effects on job histories differ between the restrictive U.S. benefit system 
and the more liberal German regulations, but also whether and to which extent 
any effects of UI benefit provision contribute to explain empirical U.S.-German 
differences in unemployment dynamics. To begin with, the causal hypotheses 
offered by economic job search theory will be briefly reviewed in the following 
section. This review will also be supplemented by a review of empirical studies 
on the issue. A separate section of the paper will then be devoted to discuss the 
data sources and statistical models used in this study, before presenting the 
results gained from both descriptive and multivariate event history analyses. 
The final section of the paper summarizes the findings and discusses their 
broader implications for sociological research on labor market dynamics. 
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1. Benefit effects on employment careers: a survey 
As has long been recognized in both sociology and economics, individual job 
histories are driven by the interplay of opportunity structures and worker 
choices. Labor markets are the arena of matching workers and jobs (Sørensen 
and Kalleberg 1981), and hence matching models will in general be the most 
adequate theoretical framework for such two-sided decision processes 
underlying observable labor market dynamics (Logan 1996). To arrive at a basic 
understanding of the effects of unemployment benefits on job histories, 
however, an even simpler, one-sided job search framework will be fully 
sufficient. Given that welfare state transfers provide additional financial 
resources to workers in the first place, it is reasonable to evaluate welfare state 
effects on job histories primarily by elaborating the ways in which these 
resources are likely to affect workers’ labor market behavior. It is important to 
note that this is not equivalent to assuming that worker choices are the primary 
determinant behind the duration of unemployment spells, or labor market 
dynamics more generally. Rather, applying search theory to the problem at 
hand basically assumes that the effect of welfare state transfers is to provide 
additional resources to workers affected from economic hardship, so that any 
welfare state effect on job histories should primarily occur through enabling 
workers to make different labor market choices than absent welfare state 
support. Whether or not employer behavior also responds to such features of 
the institutional environment will not be addressed in the following, although 
respective changes might be thought to actually reinforce any potential welfare 
state effect on worker behavior. 
Against that background, economic job search theory offers a convenient 
framework to discuss the effects of welfare state transfers, or indeed any 
alternative income sources available to workers, on workers’ job search 
outcomes (cf. Mortensen 1986; Lippman and McCall 1976a, 1976b; Burdett 
1979; but see e.g. Halaby 1988; Montgomery 1992 for alternative sociological 
applications). What makes job search theory an apt candidate in this case is 
that it provides a stringent partial theory of the determinants of worker search 
behavior while abstracting from many features of both labor market structures 
and employer behavior at the same time. As sociologists are typically well 
aware, while allowing for very detailed explorations of benefit effects on worker 
choices, this very same feature of course renders job search models a very 
incomplete and largely unsatisfactory theory of labor market dynamics more 
generally. 
Unemployment Insurance benefits and workers’ job search behavior 
Applied to the issue of effects of unemployment benefits on job search 
outcomes, job search theory offers two complementary predictions (cf. 
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Mortensen 1986, 1990; Lippman and McCall 1976a, 1976b; Burdett 1979). In 
essence, the job search argument is that through lowering the opportunity cost 
of job search which implies rising worker reservation wages, unemployment 
benefits contribute to both prolonged spell duration and improved post-
unemployment job quality. Based on an optimal stopping model borrowed from 
dynamic programming theory, the reservation wage is the core element of job 
search models: in particular, workers’ reservation wages index the threshold of 
job offers that rational workers will be ready to accept. In basic sequential 
search models satisfying the reservation wage property, workers’ optimal 
decision rule turns out as simple as that: after setting their reservation wage, 
workers should search for job offers and accept the first one that passes the 
reservation wage threshold. Stated less technically, the model assumes that 
workers have certain expectations about job quality required to stop searching. 
These expectations are formed by workers weighting the expected gains from 
continued search, notably the likelihood of finding better offers, against the 
value of accepting the current job offer and any additional costs workers would 
incur if continuing to search. Evidently, the term reservation wage should not be 
taken too literally, but rather understood as an index of job quality potentially 
comprising different job features like wages, job stability, occupations, hours of 
work or any other feature that seems relevant to workers. 
In search models, the effect of welfare state transfers, or indeed any 
alternative income source, is then to lower the opportunity cost of job search 
since additional income will raise the value of staying unemployed relative to a 
situation absent welfare state transfers. Lower opportunity costs of job search, 
however, will also imply rising reservation wages among unemployed workers, 
i.e. workers will tend to look for higher-quality jobs before stopping search. 
Microeconomic theory thus clearly stipulates welfare state effects on job 
histories beyond mere income stabilization in the short run: in fact, by relieving 
immediate financial pressures on unemployed workers to a certain extent, 
welfare state transfers are likely to allow workers to achieve improvements in 
their post-unemployment job outcomes. The mechanism behind this effect is 
that welfare state benefits will be used as a search subsidy (Burdett 1979), 
sustaining job search over the (additional) time needed to find relatively more 
adequate reemployment rather than immediate employment. Hence, at the 
price of some prolongation of search duration, a side effect of 
decommodification achieved by we lfare state transfers should be a stabilization 
of employment careers in the medium- and maybe even longer run. By basic 
job search theory, workers are expected to use welfare state benefits 
productively, i.e. by trading some additional search time for improvements in 
subsequent job quality. 
To see this more formally, consider the effects of UI benefits in the context 
of the most basic economic job search model. Given a constant job offer arrival 
rate ë of offers being drawn from a wage offer distribution F(w) , a discount rate i 
 5
at which workers discount future income streams, and workers’ current non-
employment income b, job search theory derives a reservation wage w* at 
which the expected present value of rejecting an offer and continuing to search 
exactly equals the expected present value of accepting the current job offer net 
of search costs c. Optimal worker decision-making is guaranteed if workers 
accept the first job offer exceeding w*. The reservation wage w* effectively acts 
to truncate the wage offer distribution from below, and hence indexes the 
fraction of job offers considered unacceptable by workers. Unemployment 
benefits b come into play as being positively related to the reservation wage w*, 
i.e. workers covered by UI benefits are assumed to require higher wages upon 
reemployment. If observable reemployment rates r are given by  
 
(1) [ ])(1 *wFr -´= l  , 
 
i.e. the product of offer arrival rates ë and the probability that workers will find a 
given job offer acceptable, it is easy to see that reemployment rates will tend to 
fall with rising reservation wages, as implied by 
 
(2) 0)()( ** <-=¢ wfwr l  .1 
 
At the same time, the mean of the truncated wage distribution will be 
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which is unequivocally larger than the mean of the non-truncated wage 
distribution F(w) under mild restrictions on the shape of the wage offer 
distribution. In sum, job search theory thus implies two complementary 
predictions about the relation between welfare state transfers and 
unemployment dynamics: by reducing the opportunity cost of search, transfers 
first induce workers to raise their reservation wages, and thus to search for 
relatively more adequate reemployment. By ignoring the lower tail of the wage 
offer distribution, however, this occurs against workers foregoing available job 
opportunities in the low-wage sector. Hence, the improvement in job quality 
achieved by welfare state transfers is likely to come at the price of prolonged 
spell duration. 
Empirical studies 
Sociological studies of unemployment dynamics have mostly focused on the 
stratification of unemployment dynamics in terms of the life-cycle, gender, race, 
                                                 
1  Note that this has the additional implication that benefit effects on reemployment rates are 
stronger in more dynamic labor markets, characterized by higher levels of ë. With respect to 
the U.S.-German comparison this implies a prediction of larger negative benefit effects in the 
more dynamic U.S. labor market. 
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class, or labor market sectors and segments (DiPrete 1981; Schervish 1981, 
1983; Sørensen 1987; Gallie et al. 1994; Russell and Barbieri 2000; Layte et al. 
2000), or on the relation between unemployment and macroeconomic cycles or 
longer-run structural changes (Schervish 1983; DiPrete 1993; DiPrete and 
Nonnemaker 1997; DiPrete et al. 1997). Only few studies have attempted to 
address institutional effects on unemployment dynamics, with DiPrete et al. 
(2001) and the studies compiled in Gallie and Paugam (2000; cf. Layte et al. 
2000; Bernardi et al. 2000 in particular) being  notable recent exceptions. While 
DiPrete et al. (2001) are mostly interested in evaluating contrasting predictions 
from welfare state theory, labor market regulation perspectives, and educational 
sociology in a comparison of job dynamics in France and Sweden, the large 
comparative study conducted by Gallie and Paugam (2000) is even closer to 
the interests of the current paper as it deliberately focuses on the relations 
between welfare regimes and various aspects of unemployment dynamics. So 
while both DiPrete et al. (2001), Layte et al. (2000) and Bernardi et al. (2000) 
find evidence of labor market regulation and employment protection affecting 
unemployment and job dynamics, there are some observations on direct effects 
of welfare states that are unique to  the Gallie and Paugam (2000) volume. In 
particular, the Gallie and Alm (2000) chapter reports tentative evidence that 
while unemployed workers in more generous Scandinavian welfare states are 
no less attached to the work force in general, they seem to be less inclined to 
compromise on job features required upon reemployment. Also some results by 
Layte et al. (2000) on Swedes’ lower propensity to enter low-skill occupations 
after unemployment spells might be indicative of actually lower scar effects in 
more generous welfare regimes. 
Against their many virtues, the studies compiled in Gallie and Paugam 
(2000) suffer mainly from being macrocomparative in character, thus allowing 
for only very indirect infe rences to institutional differences as the main cause of 
any unresolved cross-national differences in the empirical models. To achieve 
more direct evidence on institutional effects, the current study will thus rather 
follow the strategy of DiPrete et al. (2001:245f.) who assessed the effects of 
labor market regulation in part by comparing French and Swedish workers on 
indefinite contracts to workers on fixed-term contracts in the two countries, 
which enabled them to stringently infer the expected association between more 
flexible contracts and higher levels of job dynamics. The current study will 
extrapolate this strategy to the case of unemployment insurance as the key 
welfare state transfer to the prime-age work force. 
Of course, respective studies have since long been conducted in empirical 
labor economics, where dozens of papers have attempted to establish the 
relation between unemployment insurance and unemployment dynamics (cf. 
Atkinson and Micklewright 1991 as a review of theoretical issues; Devine and 
Kiefer 1991; Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen 1993; Machin and Manning 
1999 for reviews of the empirical literature). And indeed, most econometric 
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analyses of unemployment duration have concluded that unemployment 
benefits tend to lower reemployment rates among the unemployed. Respective 
robust evidence has been obtained for a number of countries over the past 
decades, covering the U.S. (e.g. Meyer 1990; Katz and Meyer 1990; Fallick 
1991), but also European labour markets (e.g. Hunt 1995; Hujer and Schneider 
1996; Steiner 1997 for Germany; Carling et al. 2001 for Sweden, or 
Narendranathan et al. 1985; Narendranathan 1993; Arulampalam et al. 1995 for 
UK data). On the other hand, the effects are typically found to be fairly small in 
magnitude, except among particular sub-populations like male youth during the 
school-to-work transition (e.g. UK study Narendranathan 1993). Among the 
core, prime-age work force, however, worker differences in education and skills, 
but also the effects of changing labor market conditions are certainly relatively 
more important for explaining the duration of unemployment spells in most if not 
all empirical specifications. Still, there seems to be consistent evidence of at 
least some welfare state effects on labor market dynamics. 
Interestingly enough, there are few econometric studies that actually 
evaluate benefit effects on post-unemployment job quality. There is a literature 
on displaced workers that has focused considerable attention on short- and 
longer-run scar effects of displacement, yet in terms of institutional effects, most 
studies have assessed effects of employment protection, advance notice or 
severance payments (e.g. Ruhm 1994; Fallick 1996). Most of the few available 
studies on the impact of unemployment insurance (e.g. Blau and Robins 1986; 
more recently Addison and Blackburn 2000; Belzil 1995, 2000) provide 
evidence of some small positive effects of UI benefits on post-unemployment 
earnings and wages (Blau and Robins 1986; Addison and Blackburn 2000), but 
also on post-unemployment job stability (Belzil 1995, 2000). The study by 
Addison and Blackburn (2000:39ff.) in particular reports fairly sizeable positive 
UI effects on wages as soon as the analyses compare benefit recipients to non-
recipients rather than testing for effects of replacement ratios among UI 
recipients. In any event, while the studies are sufficiently varied in their 
approaches and results, there also seem to be at least some indications of the 
expected positive UI effects on job quality coming from the microeconomics 
literature. 
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2. Data and statistical methodology 
To assess the effects of unemployment benefits on employment careers, the 
current analyses will draw on longitudinal data from U.S. and German panel 
surveys. In fact, the analytical purpose of this cross-national comparison is at 
least twofold. First of all, comparative analyses may serve as a particular kind of 
sensitivity analysis in the sense of allowing to assess the robustness of findings 
across institutionally and structurally distinct national labor markets. A U.S.-
German comparison indeed provides a veritable array of such differences, be it 
in terms of the dynamics of labor markets (DiPrete et al. 1997; Schettkat 1992; 
Garibaldi et al. 1997), the extent of labor market regulation (Grubb and Wells 
1993; Abraham and Houseman 1993; OECD 1999), the structure of education 
and training systems (Allmendinger 1989; Müller and Shavit 1998), or last but 
not least, the structure of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Mitchell 1991). 
In terms of the latter, Germany as well as many other Continental European 
countries offers a much more extensive protection against life -course risks like 
unemployment, ill health, family disruption or old age than is common in the 
United States.  
The structure of unemployment insurance (UI), which is obviously the key 
transfer program relevant to the prime-age work force, is in fact a quite 
instructive example about the nature of such institutional differences. While UI 
benefit replacement ratios actually differ very little between the United States 
and Germany (Schömann et al. 2000; Schmid and Reissert 1996; Esping-
Andersen 1990), it is benefit eligibility criteria that are considerably stiffer within 
the U.S. UI system (Grubb 2000). In consequence, actual UI benefit coverage 
rates among unemployed workers are considerably lower in the United States 
as compared to a near universal benefit coverage for German workers (Schmid 
and Reissert 1996).2 The German welfare state is thus not necessarily more 
generous in terms of individual benefit amounts, yet much more encompassing 
in terms of welfare state entitlements. 
Seen from this perspective, the U.S.-German comparison raises additional, 
and also substantively interesting issues. Given that UI benefit coverage rates 
differ tremendously among American and German workers, the current study 
provides an opportunity to assess whether potential benefit effects on individual 
job search outcomes are contingent on institutional features like the relative 
pervasiveness of social protection. But even more generally, if unemployment 
benefits actually do generate the presumed impacts on job histories, country 
differences in terms of welfare state generosity might in fact account for an 
important part of the empirical differences in unemployment dynamics between 
                                                 
2  Calculated from cross-sectional samples of unemployed workers, Schmid and Reissert 
(1996:244f.) give UI coverage rates between 70-80% for West Germany in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Based on data for the mid-1990s, Schömann et al. (2000: Appendix 1) arrive at 
UI coverage rate estimates of 40% in the U.S., and 74% for the unified Germany. 
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the United States and West Germany. If so, the current study might also 
contribute to reorient cross-national studies in social stratification and labor 
market dynamics towards the long-neglected nexus between welfare states and 
labor market behavior (DiPrete and McManus 2000; DiPrete et al. 2001; Stier et 
al. 2001; Gallie and Paugam 2000). 
Data sources 
The current analyses are based on employment history data drawn from the 
U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1991) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP; cf. Wagner et 
al. 1994; DIW 1999) study. Both studies are household panel surveys 
representative of each country’s residential population, and both surveys 
provide rich databases on labor markets, employment and job dynamics. 
Although sharing largely similar interests, both surveys do differ in terms study 
design. In particular, while the GSOEP design very much follows the design 
chosen in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID; Hill 1992) in combining 
annual interval lengths between interviews with extensive retrospective 
information on both individual life courses and calendar information on labor 
market events in the year preceding the interview, the SIPP is based on much 
shorter four-month intervals between interviews. Also, single SIPP panels have 
been discontinued after eight to ten interviews, whereas the GSOEP sample 
(including some sample refreshments) has been continuously followed since its 
original start in 1984. Against these diffe rences in study design, however, both 
surveys are likely to represent the most appropriate data sources on (short-run) 
labor market and unemployment dynamics in both countries that also include a 
wealth of social and institutional background information (cf. also Witte 1989). 
For the purpose of this paper, harmonized data from the combined SIPP 
Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993, and the West German data 
from GSOEP waves A-M (samples A+B) has been used to generate monthly 
employment history information in the 12-year observation window between 
January 1984 and December 1995. To address the effects of UI benefits on 
unemployment dynamics in the two countries, the subsequent analyses use an 
inflow sample of all unemployment spells among displaced workers that were 
begun during this observation period. Throughout this paper, displaced workers 
are defined rather loosely as workers having entered unemployment from 
dependent employment immediately preceding an unemployment spell.3 Hence, 
the spell sample drawn here excludes any unemployment spells of both first-
                                                 
3  In technical terms, any unemployment spell has been sampled from the two databases if 
individuals reported to have worked at least up to three months before the start of an 
unemployment spell. This maximum inactivity gap of two months has been allowed for in 
order to minimize the impact of late benefit take-up or workers’ recall expectations that might 
result in reporting some time of inactivity rather than active job search behavior. 
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time entrants to the labor force, but also job search periods of (mostly) women 
returning to the labor market after career interruptions. The intention behind 
restricting the analysis to the core work force highly attached to the labor market 
is to evaluate the effects of UI benefits precisely with respect to those events 
which UI benefits have been primarily designed to compensate for, namely job 
losses. 
Under these restrictions, the combined SIPP data yield a sample of 24,100 
unemployment spells of 21,551 workers that are observed for a total of 98,749 
observation months. The smaller GSOEP database still gives a total of 3,251 
unemployment spells of 2,264 workers that are observed for a total of 32,498 
months. Rates of right-censoring are 17.7% (4,254 spells) in the SIPP, and 
11.9% (387 spells) in the GSOEP data. Added to the core spell information, the 
databases include gender, age, ethnicity, workers’ education (including 
completion of vocational training in the German sample), labor force 
experience, tenure, occupation, industry and earnings with previous employer 
as main worker-level characteristics,4 but also a measure of the quarterly 
vacancy ratio calculated by the quarterly number of hires over the average 
number of unemployed in any given quarter as an indicator of aggregate labor 
market dynamics. Unemployment benefit status is measured time-constant, with 
benefit receipt being recorded if workers reported receiving UI transfers in any 
month of the unemployment spell. Compared to properly accounting for the 
effects of late benefit take-up, temporary benefit disqualification or simple 
measurement errors, this appeared as the much more robust measure, 
especially for the purposes of cross-national comparison. The distribution of 
covariates in the two samples is given in full in Appendix 1 below. 
For this spell data, finally, several different outcome measures have been 
calculated. Different kinds of transitions from unemployment can be 
distinguished from both the SIPP and the GSOEP data, yet the  current analyses 
will only be interested in destination outcomes in terms of job quality conditional 
on the incidence of a work exit from unemployment. Six different measures of 
job quality will be addressed in the analysis, representing the dimensions of 
earnings, occupations and job stability in two degrees of severity, respectively. 
More specifically, the six job quality measures used are (a) the incidence of a 
real earnings loss compared to workers pre-unemployment real earnings level, 
(b) the incidence of a real earnings loss of at least 20% of workers pre-
unemployment real earnings level, (c) the incidence of occupational mobility 
across two-digit occupations, (d) the incidence of downward status mobility 
along the Ganzeboom et al. (1992) ISEI occupational status scale, (e) the 
                                                 
4  Earnings represent real earnings in 1990 U.S. prices, with German earnings data being 
adjusted by respective 1990 purchasing power parities after being deflated. Occupation and 
industry classifications have been standardized at the level of 12 occupations and 6 broad 
industries, and separate analyses not reported in this paper have also been run using the 
Ganzeboom et al. (1992) ISEI occupational status measure. 
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probability of entering a job lasting less than six months, and (f) the probability 
of entering a job lasting less than twelve months. 
Statistical models 
Being interested in the structure of labor market flows between unemployment 
and employment, the statistical analyses of the paper are most naturally based 
on event history methods (e.g. Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; Petersen 1995; 
Tuma and Hannan 1984; Lancaster 1990). Thus, the subsequent analyses will 
address the hazard rate of leaving unemployment into employment as the key 
dependent variable. In an event history framework, the hazard rate r(t) is 
defined as 
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representing individuals’ instantaneous propensity to leave unemployment at 
spell time t, conditional on the fact that no such event has taken place up to 
spell time t. As the following analyses will apply a discrete-time approach based 
on monthly spell data (cf. Allison 1982), equation (1) becomes the probability of 
exiting unemployment for paid work within the next monthly interval t+1, given 
that workers have stayed in unemployment until spell time t. Also, basic 
statistical theory on event history analysis tells that knowledge of r(t) is sufficient 
to deduce several alternative representations of the unemployment duration 
distribution, including the duration distribution f(t) itself, but more importantly 
also the cumulative duration distribution F(t) and the survivor function G(t) = 1-
F(t) (Petersen 1995; Tuma and Hannan 1984; Lancaster 1990). 
Modeling duration distributions in terms of hazard rates rather than any 
other equivalent distribution offers the advantage of easy incorporation of 
censored cases, i.e. ongoing spells of unemployment by the end of the 
observation window.5 Also, it is fairly straightforward to address qualitatively 
different transitions and their determinants by applying a competing-risks 
framework that represents different transition processes by separate rate 
equations. In the spirit of these approaches, the subsequent analyses will use a 
particular competing-risks specification first applied in Petersen’s (1988, 1995) 
analyses of socio-economic attainment processes. More specifically, Petersen 
(1988, 1995: 500f.) decomposes the destination-specific hazard rates rk(t) into 
 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )tTkDtrtrk ==´º ,Pr  , 
 
                                                 
5  As the spell samples have been drawn conditional on pre-unemployment status, the samples 
used here exclude any left-censored or –truncated unemployment spells by definition. 
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i.e. the product of the overall exit rate r(t) and a destination equation predicting 
the type of exit k. In contrast to standard procedures of estimating the 
destination-specific hazard rates rk(t) directly, Petersen’s decomposition yields a 
formally equivalent, although more readily interpretable representation of the 
multiple destination state process if destination states differ in terms of quality 
rather than underlying causal mechanisms generating the outflow rates. As in 
Petersen’s (1988) own research on socio-economic status mobility, r(t) will be 
interpreted as the arrival rate of acceptable job offers, while the destination 
equation will determine the job type conditional on the arrival of an acceptable 
offer. Seen this way, the model also allows to properly disentangle covariate 
effects on work exit rates from covariate effects on the type of job exit, both of 
which tend to become conflated in the usual direct specification of destination-
specific rates rk(t). 
In Petersen’s original formulation, however, the above specification was 
estimated by a LIML two-step procedure that implies the assumption of 
independence between the offer arrival rate and the quality of job offers 
themselves. In contrast to both the original job search model, but also to many 
segmentation and dual labor market studies (e.g. Sørensen and Kalleberg 
1981; Eliason 1995; Lang and Dickens 1988), this essentially amounts to ignore 
the (allegedly relatively abundant) availability of alternative job offers in the 
secondary labor market by virtue of model specification. As this assumption 
appears highly questionable and also theoretically unwarranted in the present 
context, a more flexible, full-information maximum-likelihood algorithm has been 
used in the empirical analyses of this paper in order to allow for potential 
(negative) correlations between offer arrival rates and observable job quality. 
Given that job quality measures have been discretized, the event history model 
is based on the bivariate normal distribution Ö2, which defines the probit rate 
function as  
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with äwk indexing the occurrence of a work exit of job quality k. Using the 
standard setup, this leads to the log-likelihood function to be maximized of  
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In this setting the parameter vector âw reflects the effects of covariates xw on 
workers’ reemployment rates, whereas the second parameter vector âk 
represents the effects of covariates xk on the conditional probability of exiting 
into jobs of type k=1 instead of jobs of type k=0. Moreover, the parameter ñwk 
reflects any potential (negative) correlation between job quality k and offer 
arrival rates. 
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Very much as in more standard analyses, the covariate vectors will include 
measures of workers’ skills (education, experience, tenure and earnings in 
previous job, as well as completion of vocational training for German workers) 
as well as gender and information on non-white, respectively non-German 
ethnicity. Duration dependence is accounted for by including a third-order 
polynomial function in both equations. Additional control variables include 
occupation and industry dummies, a measure of the quarterly aggregate 
vacancy ratio, year dummies as well as a ‘seam’ month variable intended to 
capture the effects of linking several interview waves into a single event history 
calendar.6 Mostly in order to aid the identification of the model, the latter 
controls have been included in the rate equations only. 
The core variable of interest to the current paper is of course the effect of 
individual UI benefit status on both reemployment rates and post-unemployment 
job quality. By including this institutional variable into the model equations, the 
current analyses seek to obtain causal estimates of benefit effects on workers’ 
job histories directly at the level of individual workers. In contrast to traditional 
macrocomparative approaches applied in earlier stratification studies, this more 
direct approach promises to enable a much more precise identification of true 
causal institutional effects on job histories given that the institutional inference 
will not be biased by the presence of other unobserved institutional or structural 
differences between countries. In focusing on causal effects at the micro level of 
individual workers (while ignoring potential macro level or equilibrium effects), 
such an approach is also likely to provide a conservative estimate of the total 
effects of unemployment insurance on job histories in the sense of yielding 
conceptually attractive lower-bound estimates of the impact of institutions 
(Manski and Nagin 1998). In line with standard practice in the statistical and 
econometrics evaluation literature (cf. the reviews by Winship and Mare 1992; 
Winship and Morgan 1999; Heckman and Robb 1985, 1989; Heckman et al. 
1999), the paper will establish the causal UI effect by applying a Heckman-type 
two-stage selectivity correction to allow for “selection on unobservables” in the 
case of UI eligibility. The estimated probit models for UI treatment are given in 
Appendix 2.7 But before turning to discuss the results from these more involved 
event history models, the following section will first give some core descriptive 
                                                 
6  The ‘seam’ month is the final month of calendar information gained within any single 
interview. Methodological research on both the SIPP and the GSOEP reports artificially 
increased transition rates in these months as individuals having experienced a certain event 
during the recall period of the subsequent interview are more likely to date the event back to 
the start of the recall period. 
7  The estimation results will actually produce only limited evidence of relevant selection on 
unobservables, as UI benefit effect estimates are substantively robust to the inclusion of the 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio (respective results are available from the author on request). This 
indicates that readily observable worker characteristics are suitable predictors for UI 
eligibility, so that concerns for self-selection are much less of an issue than e.g. in the case 
of evaluations of training programs. Of course, this is precisely what would be expected from 
both the nature of unemployment insurance and the institutional regulations concerning UI 
eligibility.  
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information on unemployment dynamics in the United States and West 
Germany. 
3. Unemployment dynamics in the United States and Germany 
Labor market dynamics in general differ substantially between the U.S. and 
Continental European countries (cf. DiPrete et al. 1997; Garibaldi et al. 1997), 
and a comparison of reemployment chances among unemployed workers in the 
United States and West Germany very much conforms to the conventional 
wisdom in that respect. Even at fairly comparable levels of aggregate 
unemployment, the underlying experiences of unemployed workers in the two 
countries have differed considerably over the 1980s and 1990s. As immediately 
evident from Table 18, unemployment duration figures among German workers 
have well exceeded comparable U.S. figures throughout the period under study. 
Irrespective of cyclical conditions, median spell durations in the German labor 
market have typically been about twice the figures common among U.S. 
workers. Averaging over the 1984-1995 period, median unemployment spell 
duration has been 2.3 months among U.S. workers, yet amounted to a full 4.8 
months among unemployed workers in West Germany. Also, while 
unemployment duration figures have evolved pro-cyclically in both countries, 
German duration figures have risen particularly strongly during the recession of 
the mid-1990s. 
Unsurprisingly, differences in reemployment rates are the key component 
behind these cross-national differences in unemployment duration. In both the 
United States and West Germany, some 70% of all exits from unemployment 
are into dependent employment. Only relati vely few unemployed workers start 
up their own businesses, a certain proportion of workers facing difficulties in 
securing reemployment enter training courses or educational programs, and a 
sizeable minority of workers is - at least intermittently - withdrawing from the 
work force. In fact, while the relative proportions of these exit routes have 
remained stable among U.S. workers, the proportion of German workers exiting 
unemployment for work has fallen considerably in the 1990s, so that respective 
figures have closely paralleled U.S. figures by the mid-1990s. But against these 
well-known findings, Table 1 also provides evidence on remarkable differences 
in terms of post-unemployment job quality in the two countries which have so 
far not been documented in the literature. In fact, German workers experience 
more positive job outcomes than their U.S. counterparts on each of the six 
different job quality measures.  
                                                 
8  All tabells and figures in the appendix page 31-41 
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This differential is relatively slight if it comes to having to face any earnings 
loss upon reemployment, yet it is certainly pronounced with respect to each of 
the five other indicators. While about one third of U.S. workers experience 
earnings losses of more than 20% of their previous earnings levels, the 
respective figure among West German workers turns out to be as low as 16% 
(cf. Burda and Mertens 2001 for related results). Also, occupational mobility 
rates are substantially higher among U.S. workers: almost two thirds of U.S. 
workers find reemployment in a different two-digit occupation than the one they 
have been previously working in, and still one third of workers experiences 
downward status mobility on the ISEI status scale. The respective rates among 
German workers amount to effectively just half the U.S. figures. The very same 
country difference is also evident from data on post-unemployment job duration. 
Unemployed workers typically do not enter stable lifetime employment in neither 
West Germany nor the United States. Yet while only one quarter of German 
workers is found to have left the first job after the unemployment spell within six 
months, and about half of the German unemployed are employed in that job for 
at least one year, the respective U.S. rates amount to almost 60% of 
unemployed workers leaving their post-unemployment job within six months, 
and a full 80% of U.S. workers will have left this first job by the end of the first 
year out of unemployment. And although West German workers have certainly 
experienced a deterioration of their economic status since the mid-1980s, most 
of these marked differences have still held true by the mid-1990s. 
 
By disaggregating these figures by individual UI benefit status, Table 2 
provides some first descriptive evidence on the potential role of the welfare 
state in accounting for the above findings. There are two relevant pieces of 
evidence in the table: first of all, the bottom row of Table 2 clearly shows the 
expected and substantial differences in UI coverage between the German and 
the U.S. welfare state. While empirically almost 90% of unemployed workers in 
the German sample have had access to UI benefits, the respective U.S. figures 
have been as low as 39%. That such differences in welfare state coverage 
might translate into cross-national differences at the aggregate level is 
immediately obvious if there is evidence for differences in unemployment 
dynamics between covered and non-covered workers. And indeed, among both 
German and U.S. unemployed workers, distinguishing between workers 
covered by UI benefits and workers who are not reveals striking differences in 
the set of basic indicators of spell dynamics given in the Table 2. 
At a purely descriptive level, workers receiving UI benefits tend to 
experience longer durations of unemployment spells, yet also show relatively 
more favorable reemployment outcomes on most measures as compared to 
workers not eligible to receive benefits. Moreover, the differences between 
these two groups of unemployed workers are far from trivial empirically. The 
median spell duration among workers covered by UI benefits in the U.S. is 
 16
about 1.5 months longer than among workers without access to UI benefits, and 
the respective differential among German unemployed amounts to even more 
than two months. At the same time, workers covered by UI benefits in both 
countries are somewhat more likely to exit unemployment by taking up paid 
work rather than by – at least intermittently – withdrawing from the labor market. 
Conditional on leaving unemployment for work, workers who had received UI 
benefits during their unemployment spell also tend to show more favorable 
reemployment outcomes. The evidence is clear-cut with respect to post-
unemployment job duration, with covered workers tending to enter more secure 
jobs upon leaving unemployment. Despite large cross-national differences in 
overall job stability, rates of entering short-term jobs lasting less than six months 
differ by more than 10 percentage points between covered and non-covered 
workers in the two labor markets. If considering the proportion of jobs lasting up 
to 12 months, the differential between covered and non-covered workers still 
amounts to about six percentage points among both U.S. and German workers. 
Conditional on finding a new job, covered workers also experience lower rates 
of occupational mobility, and lower rates of downward status mobility in 
particular. The respective differentials in terms of experiencing downward status 
mobility are favoring covered workers by about 4-5 percentage points, and at 
least among U.S. workers, rates of occupational mobility among covered 
workers are about 10% lower than among non-covered workers. 
Against these results, descriptive findings on earnings mobility are more 
conflicting with notions that covered workers may trade off some prolongation of 
search duration for subsequently improved job outcomes. While there are only 
slight differences between covered and non-covered workers in terms of 
experiencing fairly large income losses of at least 20% their pre-unemployment 
earnings levels, workers covered by UI benefits actually run higher risks of 
experiencing at least some earnings losses at exiting unemployment. In the 
United States, covered workers face a 6% higher rate of experiencing an 
earnings loss as compared to non-covered workers, and this differential 
amounts to a full 17% to  the favor of non-covered workers in Germany. On the 
other hand, as none of these results has been adjusted for group differences in 
worker characteristics, all the descriptive estimates provided in Table 2 have of 
course to be regarded as tentative at best. Given the structure of UI eligibility 
requirements, it is eventually unsurprising that workers covered by UI tend to 
have higher levels of pre-unemployment work experience, higher levels of 
tenure with former employers, and higher pre-unemployment wages and 
earnings (cf. Appendix 1). To the extent that any of these worker characteristics 
affect unemployment processes, systematic group differences between covered 
and non-covered workers in terms of such background characteristics will 
naturally bias any causal inferences based on simple descriptive statistics. To 
discuss UI benefit effects on job histories in a more appropriate statistical 
framework, I now turn to the results obtained for the discrete-time event history 
models that have been described in Section 2 above. 
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4. Unemployment benefits and unemployment dynamics 
Tables 3 and 4 below have the estimation results from a series of discrete-time 
bivariate probit event history models that simultaneously address job exit rates 
and post-unemployment job quality among unemployed workers in the United 
States and West Germany. For each country, six different models have been 
estimated, one for each of the six different job quality measures defined in this 
study. The models themselves control for a wide range of covariates, including 
worker characteristics like gender, ethnicity, education and labor force 
experience, but also vacancy ratios in aggregate labor markets and potential 
additional time trends in reemployment rates. As these covariates primarily 
serve as control variables in the context of this paper, the respective estimation 
results will be summarized only briefly here. Also, the results obtained for these 
variables are mostly standard in the empirical literature on unemployment 
dynamics (Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen 1993; Devine and Kiefer 1991; 
Machin and Manning 1999; Gallie and Paugam 2000; DiPrete et al. 2001). In 
general, reemployment rates are found to exhibit negative duration 
dependence, i.e. chances of reemployment tend to fall over the course of 
unemployment spells. In terms of macroeconomic effects, reemployment rates 
are also positively related to aggregate labor market dynamics as captured by 
quarterly vacancy ratios, and relatively more so among German workers 
(results not shown). At the individual level, education, labor force experience, 
previous earnings levels and vocational training among German workers all 
contribute to higher rates of reemployment, while tenure with workers’ previous 
employer tends to lower workers’ chances to find new jobs. Also, women and 
non-white, respectively non-German workers face lower reemployment rates in 
both countries (results not shown).  
At the same time, these covariates are also found to affect job quality 
conditional on reemployment, although respective results are not always fully 
consistent in the cross-national comparison. Still, among both U.S. and German 
workers, higher levels of pre-unemployment earnings imply higher risks of 
experiencing post-unemployment earnings losses, whereas workers with higher 
levels of education tend to be better able to avoid earnings losses or short-term 
jobs on reemployment in both countries. Also, there are some indications that 
high-experience and high-tenure workers are less likely to accept reemployment 
involving earnings losses or only short-run employment prospects, but also - at 
least among German workers - occupational mobility. The evidence is much 
more consistent across the six specifications as far as duration dependence in 
job quality is concerned. Here, the results clearly yield positive duration 
dependence in all U.S. specifications, but also for most German models. Hence, 
unemployed workers apparently increasingly compromise on post-
unemployment job quality over the course of unemployment spells in favor of 
securing reemployment. Indeed, in more theoretical terms, this evidence might 
be taken to support job search models predicting falling reservation wages as 
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workers revise their expectations about post-unemployment job quality. 
Alternatively, one might of course see the results as evidence of increasing skill 
depreciation over time spent unemployed, which might also lead to a 
deterioration of attainable job quality over the duration of unemployment spells. 
 
Against this background, the models provide near unequivocal empirical 
support for the key issue raised here, namely the impact of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment dynamics. Across all different specifications of job 
quality measures, but also if compared across countries, the hazard rate 
estimates consistently establish a substantial and statistically significant 
negative effect of UI benefits on both reemployment rates among unemployed 
workers and workers’ risks of accepting inferior jobs upon reemployment. 
Hence, receiving UI benefits tends to both lower job-finding rates among 
unemployed workers and, at the same time, raises the quality of jobs taken on 
by workers leaving unemployment. Interestingly, this finding is robust across job 
quality being measured in terms of earnings, occupations or job stability. 
Against some prolongation of unemployment spells, UI benefits thus 
significantly reduce the risks of workers experiencing earnings losses, 
occupational mobility and low job security subsequent to leaving 
unemployment. Basically, this conclusion also seems to be robust in the cross-
national comparison between the U.S. and the West German labor market. And 
although the evaluation of causal UI effects is more involved in this case for 
both the considerably smaller sample sizes available in the GSOEP and the 
more encompassing UI coverage among German workers, the results for UI 
benefit effects in the GSOEP data are remarkably consistent with those 
established from the SIPP sources.  
Again, UI benefits imply lower reemployment rates among unemployed 
workers, although the magnitude of the difference tends to be smaller than 
established from the U.S. data. In addition, there is also consistent evidence on 
positive UI effects on post-unemployment job quality, at least in the models 
addressing fairly sizeable earnings losses, occupational mobility, downward 
status mobility and short-run job stability (the UI parameter in the equation for 
job durations less than six months barely misses the 10% significance level). In 
contrast, the models with any earnings loss or job stability measured over the 
first year of employment do not yield substantive UI benefit effects, which might 
be indicative of UI benefits mostly acting to prevent more severe career 
implications in the more regulated German labor market. 
But in any event, and very much as predicted by the most basic job search 
model, the frictional unemployment induced by UI benefits is thus productive in 
the sense that this additional search time generates a pay-off in terms of 
improved job quality. In the terminology of job search theory, this is precisely 
the effect described for additional income sources lowering the opportunity cost 
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of job search, which in turn implies both longer search durations and higher 
quality of accepted jobs among workers. Apparently, this result is very different 
from those conveyed by many conventional microeconomic analyses. As the 
latter have almost exclusively focused on the duration part of the model, these 
studies have unsurprisingly concluded that UI benefits in particular, but also 
welfare state transfers more generally, establish severe work disincentives, with 
unemployed workers substituting time on benefits for time spent in paid work. 
The more complete model considered here supports a quite different conclusion 
about the relation between welfare states and labor market dynamics, however. 
Given that UI benefit provision apparently provides workers with financial 
resources that allow them to favor adequate reemployment over immediate 
reemployment, welfare state transfers primarily appear to affect career stability 
and continuity in job careers rather than incentives to work per se. In protecting 
workers against the threats of earnings losses, insecure jobs and occupational 
mobility, welfare state transfers would hence be better understood as worker 
resources that contribute to stabilizing careers and to maintaining workers’ 
previously accumulated human capital and skills. 
As evident from the marginal UI benefit effect estimates presented in Table 
5, the implied magnitudes of these institutional effects are far from trivial. To 
illustrate these, Table 5 contains information on marginal UI benefit effects on 
different aspects of unemployment processes, calculated at four different points 
of elapsed spell duration (T=1, 3, 6, and 12 months). Among the different 
quantities provided, benefit effects on r(t) and F(t) obviously describe the 
negative impact of UI benefits on unemployment duration. Among both U.S. and 
German workers, unemployment benefits tend to reduce job finding rates r(t) 
among the unemployed, which in consequence also implies lower cumulated 
probabilities F(t) of work exits from unemployment. Apparently, UI effects on 
unemployment duration are considerably stronger in the U.S. labor market. UI 
benefits are estimated to lower work exit rates by some 6% points at the 
beginning of unemployment spells, which is equivalent to a full 30% reduction in 
outflow rates absent UI benefit coverage. Naturally, this effect translates into 
respective reductions in the cumulated probability F(t) of having exited 
unemployment by taking up paid work. According to the model estimates, UI 
benefit effects imply reductions in F(t) of some 12-14% points by spell months 3 
to 6 (equivalent to some 20% reduction in F(t)). The comparable German 
estimates are smaller in magnitudes, with UI benefits lowering work exit rates 
r(t) by about 1.5% points. As reemployment rates are generally much lower in 
the German labor market, this amounts to reducing exit rates by about 15%, 
which leads to lowering F(t) by 4-6% points by spell months 3 to 6 (equaling a 
12-14% reduction in F(t)). 
 
These effects of UI benefits on reemployment rates are counterbalanced of 
course by positive UI effects on post-unemployment job quality. In terms of both 
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earnings, occupations and job stability, UI benefits consistently lower the 
probability of exiting unemployment into jobs that imply earnings losses, 
(downward) occupational mobility or subsequently low levels of job security. 
Evaluated at T=12, i.e. when most workers will already have left unemployment, 
the implied benefit differentials on job quality measures range between 2% and 
9% points among U.S. workers. Effectively, these results imply that UI benefits 
tend to lower workers’ risks of experiencing earnings losses by 14%, and even 
by 22% for the case of more severe earnings losses. Also, there are sizeable 
reductions of some 10% in rates of occupational mobility, downward status 
mobility or in the probability of accepting jobs of less than six months stability. If 
anything, the respective effect sizes are even larger in the German labor 
market, at least in terms of those more severe measures where benefit effects 
could be established in the models. Evaluated again over the first 12 months of 
unemployment spells, UI benefits are predicted to reduce occupational mobility 
rates by 12%, rates of downward status mobility by 14%, the probability of fairly 
severe earnings losses by 9%, and the likelihood of accepting low-stability jobs 
by still 6% points. Given that German workers face lower rates of experiencing 
any of these events in general, the relative reductions amount to a sizeable 
25% in the case of earnings losses and job duration, 36% in the case of 
occupational mobility, and a full 45% reduction in the rate of downward status 
mobility. Compared to the U.S. labor market, UI benefits in the German context 
thus appear to be even relatively more effective in sheltering workers against 
more severe career disruptions at the price of a relatively smaller increase in 
unemployment duration. 
In fact, as all specifications imply job offer arrival rates to be smaller in 
Germany, the result of larger benefit effects on U.S. reemployment rates is 
consistent with basic predictions from search theory. The mechanism specified 
in job search models is that, as workers are primarily interested in the upper 
tails of the offer distribution, workers can afford to require particularly good 
matches if offers arrive frequently. An alternative explanation might be a purely 
compositional one, however, if it is argued that a more encompassing benefit 
coverage might increasingly include low-skill workers who could fairly readily 
improve on job quality against an only minor prolongation of unemployment 
spells. In addition, the results for the rate models also point to a second cross-
national difference that might warrant future study. In particular, the results 
obtained for the correlation parameter ñ point to some interesting structural 
difference between the two labor markets: interestingly, ñ is in fact significantly 
positive as expected in all models but those with job stability as the job outcome 
measure among the German unemployed. Hence, while it seems to be the case 
that unemployed workers in both the U.S. and the West German labor market 
might increase their opportunity sets by accepting lower earnings jobs or jobs in 
different or lower-status occupations, there seems to be a country difference 
with respect to the existence of low-duration job opportunities. While the 
correlation of reemployment rates and low job stability is also positive for U.S. 
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workers, there is evidence of a negative correlation in the comparable models 
for German workers. In contrast to the United States, German unemployed thus 
would apparently not increase their chances of finding jobs by increasingly 
accepting low-stability jobs. It thus seems, although necessarily very tentative at 
this stage, that the German employment structure puts heavy restrictions on the 
availability of low-stability jobs, which might in part also explain lower 
reemployment rates there.9  
Benefit effects over spell duration, earnings and skill groups 
The above reading of the evidence as welfare state transfers contributing to 
preserve workers’ previously accumulated human capital could be strengthened 
further if there was evidence of significant non-linearities in the relationship 
between skill measures and benefit effects, i.e. if benefit effects were 
particularly effective in protecting skills and earnings capacities among high-
tenure, high-skill or high-wage workers. Even absent additional interaction 
effects between UI benefits and worker characteristics, it is important to realize 
that a first source of such non-linearities actually lies in the non-linear functional 
form of the probit model itself. As common also with other non-linear probability 
models like the logit model, the marginal probability effect of a given covariate 
depends on the point on the distribution at which the effect is to be evaluated. In 
general, the covariate’s marginal effect on the probability will be largest if 
evaluated exactly at p=0.5 in both probit and logit models, and diminishing as 
this baseline probability either falls or increases. In this non-linear context, any 
covariate Z that induces substantial shifts in the dependent variable Y is hence 
also likely to induce varying effect sizes of the causal benefit effect X on 
unemployment dynamics. If Z implies considerable changes in Y, even a simple 
main effect of X will show varying marginal probability effects if evaluated at 
different values of Z.  
A case in point is the “interaction” between workers earnings capacity as 
measured by previous earnings levels and the effects of unemployment 
benefits. The models for both U.S. and German workers imply that high-
earnings workers are structurally more likely to experience earnings losses 
upon reemployment. Given that previous earnings levels thus substantially 
affect the probability of an earnings loss, the non-linear probit functional form 
implies varying effect sizes of the same benefit main effect among workers with 
                                                 
9  A realist alternative explanation for the negative correlation obtained in the German job 
duration models might be a drawback of the GSOEP questionnaire design which is likely to 
imply a severe under-representation of short job spells (of less than one year duration) in 
data that uses only spell data with complete covariate information on occupation, industry or 
earnings. In particular, the latter information is not collected on a job-by-job basis, but rather 
only for the job currently held at the time of the interview. Hence even after (necessarily 
limited) attempts to substitute and impute such information based on some retrospective 
questions available, it is unlikely that this design flaw can be fully compensated for. 
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different earnings capacities. In particular, evaluating the marginal effects in the 
sample of U.S. workers at pre-unemployment earnings levels of $500, $1000, 
$2000 and $4000 yields marginal benefit effect estimates of –7.6%, -10.4%, -
11.4%, and –10.0%, respectively, on the probability of experiencing an earnings 
loss of more than 20% the pre-unemployment earnings level. Evaluated at the 
same points of the earnings distribution, the respective German estimates 
amount to –2.3% ($500), -5.5% ($1000), -10.0% ($2000), and even –13.7% at 
$4000, whereas the marginal benefit effect evaluated at the mean earnings 
level had only been –7.5%. While the case of earnings capacities is particularly 
instructive due to the strength of the relationship between earnings levels and 
risks of experiencing subsequent earnings losses, similar non-linear effects will 
be apparent for any of the covariates involved. Thus, to the extent that levels of 
education, work experience or job tenure were found to be related to the 
structure of unemployment dynamics, the non-linear functional form of the probit 
models themselves already implies (moderately) reinforced UI benefit effects 
among high-skill, high-wage or high-tenure workers. 
 
To evaluate potential non-linearities beyond those implied by functional 
form alone, Table 6 presents additional results from a series of models that 
include interaction terms between UI benefit status, spell duration, work 
experience, tenure, earnings, and vacancy levels on the market in both 
equations of the bivariate probit models. Empirically, there is consistent 
evidence for some relevant interaction effects at least in the U.S. data, whereas 
the likelihood-ratio model tests indicate statistically significant improvements in 
model fit only for three out of the six German models. Across countries, the 
interaction effect most consistently established is a positive one between benefit 
effects and spell duration. Hence, both the negative effect of UI benefits on 
reemployment rates and the positive benefit effects on job quality tend to 
decline over spell duration, with workers of different benefit status becoming 
increasingly similar in their job search behavior.10 Hence, and again in contrast 
to the disincentive view of UI effects, while workers on UI benefits apparently 
attempt to realize a premium in terms of job quality particularly early in 
unemployment spells, their job search behavior increasingly converges to the 
behavior of non-covered workers. If workers learn that achieving fully adequate 
reemployment does not appear to be feasible in the current labor market 
context, even workers on UI benefits obviously increasingly tend to downwardly 
adjust their expectations about subsequent job quality levels.11 
                                                 
10  The negative interaction term for benefits and spell duration in the equation for 
reemployment rates among German workers is in fact the main conflicting finding in this 
case. The evidence for this effect is not robust to alternative model specifications, however, 
and is only obtained in the models with earnings as the job quality variable. For both the 
occupational mobility and the job duration models, the respective estimate is much lower 
(b=-0.003 and b=-0.001, respectively), and no longer statistically different from zero. 
11  There are two alternative readings competing with the reservation wage argument made 
here. First, declining differences between covered and non-covered workers might actually 
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 Apart from this effect, there is also some evidence that unemployment 
benefits tend to be particularly effective in preventing downward status mobility 
of high-earnings workers, and also have disproportionately strong effects on 
certain job outcomes among high-tenure workers (job stability among U.S. 
workers, earnings levels among German workers). For Germany at least, there 
is also some evidence that benefit coverage tends to reduce occupational 
mobility rates particularly among high-experience workers. Apart from these 
effects, there do not seem to be major deviations from the non-linear effects 
implied in the probit functional form. 
Unemployment Insurance effects and cross-national differences in 
unemployment dynamics 
As UI benefit coverage was consistently found to generate markedly different 
unemployment outcomes at the level of individual workers, cross-national 
differences in welfare state generosity are likely to show substantial impacts on 
cross-national differences in unemployment dynamics. For straightforward 
compositional reasons, aggregate unemployment dynamics of West German 
workers will differ from aggregate U.S. figures because of a larger proportion of 
German workers having access to UI benefit provision. In consequence, the 
average German worker will be much more likely in a position to relatively favor 
adequate reemployment over immediate reemployment – and hence, higher 
levels of transfer coverage is likely to imply both longer spell durations and 
higher levels of job quality among the average German unemployed. To assess 
the empirical magnitudes of this effect, a small series of counterfactual 
simulation analyses were conducted that simulated the effect of substituting the 
empirical UI eligibility regulations between the two countries. While the technical 
implementation of the analyses is described more fully in Appendix 3, it might 
be sufficient to convey the basic idea behind the analyses here. Effectively, the 
simulations for the U.S. sample attempt to address the extent of change in 
aggregate unemployment dynamics if, given their characteristics and previous 
job histories, U.S. workers had the same level of access to UI benefits as 
common for German workers, and vice versa, the German simulations will 
address the consequences of stiffening eligibility rules according to empirical 
U.S. standards. As such, comparing these results to the empirical country 
differences described in Section 3 above will also give an estimate of the 
                                                                                                                                               
result from short UI benefit duration in the U.S., so that workers will tend to become more 
similar as initially covered workers run out of benefits. While the argument is certainly 
plausible, the fairly similar evidence for German workers (at least in the first three models) 
who are mostly covered indefinitely by UI benefits would seem to suggest that there is more 
to the effect than this institutional explanation. Alternatively, it might of course be that beyond 
a certain threshold of “legitimate” search unemployment, employers will consider 
unemployed applicants as “lemons” and will hence be lowering the quality of the job offers to 
the long-term unemployed, which might also generate an increasing tendency of 
convergence towards lower levels of job quality. 
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relative role of welfare state differences in explaining U.S.-German differences 
in unemployment dynamics more generally. 
The results comparing the status quo to the counterfactual estimates are 
given in Figures 1 and 2 for simulation runs on three selected outcome 
measures (severe earnings losses, downward status mobility, job duration less 
than 6 months) on the U.S. and West German samples, respectively. Each 
panel in the two figures contains the simulation results on two key quantities 
describing unemployment dynamics implied by the baseline models given in 
Tables 3 and 4 above: the pseudo-survivor function G*(t) for work exits on the 
one hand, and the conditional probability of entering jobs with the attribute in 
question. Obviously, the more G*(t) shifts to the left, the higher the underlying 
reemployment rates, and the shorter the overall duration of unemployment. By 
the same token, the more the predicted job quality function is shifted upward, 
the lower the implied post-unemployment job quality. In each of the panels, 
simulation outcome ‘1’ gives the empirical status quo, i.e. the simulation run 
under actual empirical conditions. Simulation ‘2’ then signifies the predicted 
aggregated counterfactual outcomes if UI eligibility rules in the U.S. would 
become as liberal as the current German rules, and vice versa. In the following, 
each country’s empirical UI eligibility rules are equated with the probit models 
for UI benefit status (given in Appendix 2), which were also used earlier to 
generate the inverse Mills’ ratio scores to correct for potential selection on 
unobservables into UI. 
 
As expected, applying these counterfactual eligibility rules significantly 
boosts UI coverage rates among U.S. unemployed from an empirical 38.8% to 
an expected counterfactual of 81.8%. In contrast, stiffening the liberal German 
rules according to the U.S. rules is estimated to imply a drop in UI coverage 
rates from the empirical 89.2% down to 54.4%. Hence, even as there are cross-
national differences in the structure of unemployed workers that also translate 
into respective differences in UI coverage rates, institutional differences in 
eligibility rules are apparently the main reason behind the huge U.S.-German 
differential in terms of benefit coverage rates. And as Figures 1 and 2 aptly 
illustrate, the effects of such compositional differences do generate 
considerable repercussions at the level of aggregate unemployment dynamics. 
In all three simulations on U.S. data, liberalizing strict UI eligibility rules 
(simulation 2) implies a rightward shift of the pseudo-survivor function G*(t) and 
a downward shift on the job quality measure. More extensive UI coverage 
hence clearly has the effect of increasing both average unemployment spell 
duration and average post-unemployment job quality. In quantitative terms, 
German-style liberal UI eligibility conditions are estimated to raise median spell 
duration by about 0.6 months, while at the same time reducing the probability of 
experiencing severe earnings losses by some 5%, and the probability of both 
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downward status mobility and of entering low-stability jobs by about 3% each.12 
The reverse counterfactual prediction in the German case amount to an 
equivalently slight decline in median spell duration by some 0.6 months due to 
strict U.S.-style eligibility regulation, accompanied by a 4% increase in the 
probability of downward status mobility, a 3% increase in the likelihood of 
experiencing severe earnings losses, and a 2% increase in the probability of 
entering jobs lasting less than six months. 
While hardly spectacular in themselves, relating these figures to empirical 
U.S.-German differences in the structure of unemployment processes does 
suggest a considerable role for the structure of welfare states in shaping 
unemployment processes and post-unemployment job outcomes. Relative to 
the empirical differences between the two countries, the higher German UI 
benefit coverage rates alone account for about 14% of the longer spell 
durations, but also about 15%-26% of lower rates of earnings losses, 18%-24% 
of lower rates of downward status mobility, and still 6%-9% of lower rates of 
low-stability employment among West German workers. Both against 
remarkable country differences in educational systems or the regulation of labor 
markets, and even absent more involved attempts to trace more indirect we lfare 
state effects working e.g. through the effects of employment protection on the 
structure of unemployed workers (e.g. DiPrete et al. 2001), the direct effects of 
welfare state generosity on job histories among unemployed workers seems 
remarkably strong indeed. While certainly not the only relevant explanation for 
U.S.-German differences in unemployment dynamics, the more generous 
German welfare state certainly contributes to German workers achieving better 
post-unemployment job outcomes at the price of some prolongation of 
unemployment spells. Welfare state transfers thus obviously act as a worker 
resource in attaining relatively more adequate reemployment outcomes, hence 
stabilizing and smoothing individual job histories. Through this human capital-
preserving function, welfare state transfers are apparently effective in 
smoothing the consequences of unemployment beyond a merely short-run 
stabilization of income streams also in the medium- and maybe even longer run. 
 
                                                 
12  Note, however, that the duration prediction refers to the pseudo-survivor function based on 
work exits only, and is hence only indirectly related to actual unemployment duration. As the 
relative role of non-employment exits was fairly similar in both countries, the cross-national 
inferences are unlikely to be significantly biased by the more colloquial terminology. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
Although social stratification analyses and sociological studies of labor markets 
have since long been interested in institutional influences on labor market 
dynamics and individual job histories, it has been only very recently that 
sociologists have seriously taken interest in the relationship between welfare 
state policies and employment careers. In many respects complementary to 
recent papers by DiPrete et al. (2001) on the effects of labor market regulation 
and employment protection on job dynamics, by Stier et al. (2001) on the effects 
of family policies on women’s job histories, or by Gallie and Alm(2000), Layte et 
al. (2000) or Bernardi et al. (2000) that compared unemployment dynamics in 
different welfare state contexts, the current paper has focused on the direct 
effects of unemployment benefits on workers’ job histories. 
In line with predictions derived from economic job search theory, the paper 
has in fact obtained empirical evidence that, beyond merely providing transfers 
compensating for current earnings losses, unemployment benefits also tend to 
stabilize employment careers in a broader sense. Independently of being 
measured by earnings, occupational mobility or job stability, workers covered by 
unemployment insurance tend to achieve better post-unemployment job 
outcomes than comparable workers not covered by unemployment benefits. In 
particular, unemployment benefits appear effective in enabling workers to 
prevent fairly substantial scar effects like severe earnings losses, downward 
status mobility or having to accept very unstable jobs in order to escape from 
unemployment. The analyses also stress that this improvement in job quality 
occurs against some prolongation of unemployment duration. As lower-level 
jobs are structurally more readily available, a relative improvement in job quality 
will apparently necessitate longer job search durations. In any event, this 
additional search time induced by UI benefits appears to be productive in the 
sense that benefits protect workers’ accumulated human capital as well as 
workers’ earnings capacity resulting from these skills. Hence, welfare state 
transfers contribute to stabilizing employment careers by limiting the scar 
effects induced by unemployment experiences. 
These findings on the role of unemployment insurance have also been 
remarkably robust in the cross-national comparison between the U.S. and the 
West German. If anything, there is some evidence that unemployment 
insurance enhances post-unemployment job qua lity to an even larger extent in 
the context of the more encompassing German UI system. Still, the basically 
similar evidence on benefit effects at the micro level of individual workers 
implies that welfare state differences between the United States and West 
Germany will assume an important role in accounting for observable differences 
in unemployment dynamics in the two countries. If unemployment benefits have 
stabilizing effects on worker careers, and if UI coverage rates among German 
unemployed are substantially above those among U.S. workers, then 
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unemployment dynamics should differ between the two labor markets for simple 
compositional reasons. And in fact, some straightforward simulation analyses 
strongly suggest that welfare state differences are an important component in 
explaining why unemployment durations are longer, yet scar effects as 
measured by earnings losses, occupational mobility or low job stability are 
smaller among German unemployed. According to relatively conservative 
estimates, the direct effects of differences in welfare state generosity amount to 
account for about 14% of the U.S.-German differential in terms of reemployment 
rates, between 15%-26% of the country differences in terms of rates of earnings 
losses and downward status mobility, and still up to 10% of U.S.-German 
differences in rates of taking up low-stability jobs. 
Hence, while the results do point to an important role of the welfare state, 
they also suggest important additional institutional and structural factors at work 
that are necessary to incorporate in a fuller account of why unemployment 
dynamics (and labor market dynamics more generally) differ that remarkably 
between the United States and West Germany or other European countries. It 
seems very likely that a more complete account would have to include 
institutional differences in labor market regulation, as more flexible labor 
markets have been shown to create higher levels of turnover, and hence higher 
levels of job opportunity also for the unemployed (e.g. Garibaldi et al. 1997). 
Also, the institutional structure of education and training systems should have 
its role to play especially in U.S.-German comparisons, as the high degree of 
skill specialization occurring through the dual system of vocational training 
should lead to relatively strong worker interests to maintain occupational 
continuity upon reemployment even among intermediately qualified workers. 
And last but not least, some scholars have argued that processes of structural 
change have been more pronounced in Germany as compared to the United 
States (e.g. Schettkat 1992), which might also contribute to the observed 
country differences. 
In any event, it seems that a particular advantage of using microdata-based 
methods of institutional analysis has been that, based on these detailed data, it 
has been possible to perform the kind of decomposition and counterfactual 
simulation analyses reported in Section 4 above. Especially through such 
explicit incorporation of micro-level institutional information into stratification 
analyses, the precision of inferences about institutional effects should greatly 
improve both within any single country, but even more importantly so in cross-
nationally comparative studies. Against that background, the current paper has 
hopefully also offered additional tools that should prove useful for bridging the 
gap between estimating micro-level models and (comparative) sociologists’ 
macro level concerns in future empirical studies. In any event, these methods 
appear useful in arriving at rich quantitative assessments of the implications of 
specific institutional arrangements. In the case of welfare state effects 
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addressed in this paper, the estimates certainly suggest a quite considerable 
impact. 
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Table 1 
Unemployment dynamics in the United States and West Germany, 1984-1995 
 1984-95 1984-86 1987-89 1990-92 1993-95 
 United States 
Stand. unemployment rate 6.32 % 7.13 % 5.58 % 6.46 % 6.13 % 
Median spell duration (months) 2.31 2.18 1.93 2.59 2.73 
% work exits 0.695 0.705 0.698 0.684 0.693 
- thereof: with earnings losses 0.496 0.464 0.507 0.521 0.499 
- thereof: earnings loss > 20% 0.356 0.343 0.351 0.369 0.361 
- thereof: occupationally mobile 0.639 0.655 0.653 0.603 0.641 
- thereof: downwardly mobile 0.331 0.336 0.325 0.328 0.332 
- thereof: job < 6 months 0.584 0.614 0.607 0.585 0.546 
- thereof: job < 12 months 0.815 0.839 0.888 0.780 0.784 
 West Germany 
Stand. unemployment rate 5.94 % 6.87 % 5.98 % 4.55 % 6.36 % 
Median spell duration 4.80 5.07 3.61 4.52 5.76 
% work exits 0.708 0.748 0.764 0.624 0.673 
- thereof: with earnings losses 0.459 0.367 0.447 0.475 0.612 
- thereof: earnings loss > 20% 0.160 0.115 0.155 0.154 0.246 
- thereof: occupationally mobile 0.333 0.293 0.377 0.391 0.305 
- thereof: downwardly mobile 0.164 0.126 0.212 0.215 0.137 
- thereof: job < 6 months 0.257 0.223 0.278 0.261 0.271 
- thereof: job < 12 months 0.535 0.514 0.548 0.528 0.552 
Notes: Occupational mobility is measured across two-digit occupations. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M), weighted data;  
standardized unemployment rates from OECD (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
Table 2 
Unemployment dynamics and UI benefit status, 1984-1995 
 United States West Germany 
 with  
UI benefits 
without 
UI benefits 
with  
UI benefits 
without 
UI benefits 
Median spell duration (months) 3.37 1.78 5.10 2.80 
% work exits 0.739 0.672 0.712 0.679 
- thereof: with earnings losses 0.535 0.472 0.473 0.307 
- thereof: earnings loss > 20% 0.373 0.346 0.161 0.153 
- thereof: occupationally 
mobile 
0.576 0.676 0.332 0.334 
- thereof: downwardly mobile 0.307 0.344 0.161 0.215 
- thereof: job < 6 months 0.511 0.628 0.241 0.386 
- thereof: job < 12 months 0.774 0.838 0.529 0.590 
% workers with UI benefits 0.389 0.892 
Notes: Occupational mobility is measured across two-digit occupations. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M), weighted data. 
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Table 3 
Unemployment dynamics in the United States, discrete-time bivariate probit hazard rate models 
 Job exit rate Job quality 
  Any earnings 
loss 
Earnings loss  
> 20% 
Occupational 
mobility 
Downward 
status mobility 
Job duration  
< 6 months 
Job duration  
< 12 months 
Intercept  -1.273 (.119)**  -4.963 (.209)**  -4.572 (.211)**  -0.716 (.261)**  -1.696 (.246)**  -1.205 (.231)**  0.955 (.339)** 
Unemployment benefits  -0.237 (.012)**  -0.314 (.023)**  -0.353 (.024)**  -0.254 (.028)**  -0.169 (.028)**  -0.225 (.025)**  -0.139 (.036)** 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.004 (.031)  -0.008 (.053)  -0.053 (.055)  0.294 (.057)**  0.133 (.056)**  0.428 (.060)**  0.763 (.086)** 
T  -0.033 (.003)**  0.017 (.007)**  0.026 (.008)**  0.116 (.012)**  0.038 (.007)**  -0.004 (.008)  0.016 (.012) 
T² (x 100)  0.036 (.012)**  -0.095 (.041)**  -0.112 (.042)**  -0.538 (.104)**  -0.133 (.040)**  -0.020 (.050)  -0.006 (.084) 
T³ (x 10,000)  -0.115 (.074)  0.645 (.353)*  0.771 (.364)**  6.490 (2.34)**  0.986 (.350)**  0.031 (.554)  -0.307 (.782) 
Schooling  0.021 (.003)**  -0.039 (.006)**  -0.026 (.006)**  0.031 (.006)**  0.026 (.006)**  0.016 (.006)**  -0.043 (.008)** 
Labor force experience  0.007 (.002)**  -0.008 (.004)**  -0.011 (.004)**  -0.004 (.004)  0.003 (.004)  0.005 (.004)  0.005 (.005) 
Labor force experience² (x 100)  -0.023 (.004)**  0.002 (.008)  0.012 (.008)  -0.008 (.009)  -0.012 (.009)  -0.009 (.009)  -0.008 (.012) 
Tenure in previous job  -0.001 ( 2e-4)**  3.7e-4 ( 4e-4)  2.0e-4 ( 5e-4)  -0.001 ( 5e-4)  4.3e-4 ( 5e-4)  -0.004 (.001)**  -0.004 (.001)** 
Tenure in previous job² (x 100)  6.2e-5 ( 8e-5)  -3.0e-4 ( 2e-4)**  -1.4e-4 ( 2e-4)  4.2e-4 ( 2e-4)**  6.2e-6 ( 2e-4)  0.001 ( 2e-4)**  0.001 ( 2e-4)** 
Ln(previous earnings)  0.041 (.012)**  0.700 (.032)**  0.612 (.029)**  0.024 (.022)  0.067 (.022)**  0.083 (.022)**  0.192 (.030)** 
        
ρ12   0.599 (.061)**  0.550 (.069)**  0.103 (.084)  0.213 (.082)**  0.533 (.055)**  0.292 (.106)** 
Log-likelihood  -45,433 -45,256 -47,269 -46,662 -39,755 -33,667 
LR-Test χ² (df)  5,096 (38)** 4,309 (38)** 3,199 (38)** 2,606 (38)** 3,169 (38)** 2,911 (38)** 
Pseudo-R²  0.053 0.045 0.033 0.027 0.038 0.041 
N (observation months)  85,193 85,193 86,746 85,639 77,657 73,178 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. As additional controls, all models include gender, ethnicity, the 
aggregate vacancy ratio, annual dummies as well as a seam month variable in the rate equation. The rate model estimates given are those obtained in 
the model for earnings losses. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993. 
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Table 4 
Unemployment dynamics in West Germany, discrete-time bivariate probit hazard rate models 
 Job exit rate Job quality 
  Any earnings 
loss 
Earnings loss  
> 20% 
Occupational 
mobility 
Downward 
status mobility 
Job duration  
< 6 months 
Job duration  
< 12 months 
Intercept  -3.214 (.555)**  -8.778 (1.06)**  -6.585 (1.37)**  -1.814 (1.72)  1.775 (1.98)  -0.254 (1.25)  1.605 (.980) 
Unemployment benefits  -0.099 (.058)*  -0.022 (.121)  -0.370 (.149)**  -0.323 (.179)**  -0.483 (.197)**  -0.191 (.122)  0.078 (.102) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.340 (.288)  1.311 (.597)**  -0.867 (.951)  1.148 (.905)  0.892 (.999)  0.473 (.584)  0.210 (.499) 
T  -0.031 (.006)**  0.014 (.019)  0.060 (.024)**  4.4e-4 (.029)  0.020 (.029)  0.095 (.016)**  0.040 (.013)** 
T² (x 100)  0.034 (.025)  -0.127 (.088)  -0.176 (.102)*  0.027 (.125)  -4.6e-4 (.095)  -0.287 (.066)**  -0.145 (.055)** 
T³ (x 10,000)  -0.179 (.232)  1.470 (1.14)  1.080 (1.21)  0.158 (1.65)  -0.123 (.778)  2.110 (.580)**  1.210 (.502)** 
Schooling  -0.010 (.009)  -0.065 (.019)**  -0.031 (.024)  -0.014 (.025)  -0.057 (.031)**  0.003 (.018)  -0.034 (.016)** 
Vocational training  0.089 (.034)**  0.138 (.072)*  -0.015 (.095)  -0.111 (.113)  -0.172 (.129)  -0.094 (.079)  -0.141 (.063)** 
Labor force experience  0.010 (.007)  -0.003 (.015)  -0.034 (.021)  0.060 (.023)**  0.062 (.027)**  -0.028 (.016)*  -0.028 (.013)** 
Labor force experience² (x 100)  -0.054 (.014)**  0.005 (.036)  0.057 (.049)  -0.162 (.054)**  -0.153 (.063)**  0.068 (.039)*  0.105 (.030)** 
Tenure in previous job  -0.004 (.001)**  0.001 (.002)  -3.2e-5 (.002)  0.002 (.002)  0.001 (.002)  -0.002 (.001)  -0.006 (.001)** 
Tenure in previous job² (x 100)  4.5e-4 ( 2e-4)**  4.9e-4 ( 5e-4)  -4.9e-4 (.001)  -0.001 (.001)  -3.6e-4 (.001)  0.001 ( 5e-4)  0.001 ( 4e-4)** 
Ln(previous earnings)  0.234 (.065)**  1.096 (.138)**  0.786 (.165)**  0.093 (.184)  0.129 (.208)  -0.028 (.138)  -0.061 (.113) 
        
ρ12   0.629 (.125)**  0.440 (.183)**  0.385 (.274)  0.240 (.332)  -0.268 (.185)  -0.518 (.132)** 
Log-likelihood  -4,697.0 -4,453.7 -3,147.2 -3,040.5 -6,298.6 -6,443.0 
LR-Test χ² (df)  1,368 (40)** 1,318 (40)**  785.4 (40)**  784.9 (54)** 1,385 (40)** 1,390 (40)** 
Pseudo-R²  0.127 0.129 0.111 0.114 0.099 0.097 
N (observation months)  22,934 22,934 20,521 20,521 26,555 26,222 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. As additional controls, all models include gender, ethnicity, the 
aggregate vacancy ratio, annual dummies as well as a seam month variable in the rate equation. The rate model estimates given are those obtained in 
the model for earnings losses. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M). 
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Table 5 
Estimated marginal benefit effects on unemployment dynamics 
T (months) 1 3 6 12 
 United States 
∆ r(t) -0.063 (-28.3) -0.060 (-29.1) -0.055 (-30.3) -0.046 (-32.4) 
∆ F(t) -0.063 (-28.3) -0.123 (-23.9) -0.138 (-18.9) -0.108 (-11.9) 
∆ Pr(earnings loss | work exit) -0.080 (-15.9) -0.079 (-15.5) -0.078 (-14.9) -0.074 (-14.0) 
∆ Pr(earnings loss > 20% | work exit) -0.091 (-24.6) -0.091 (-24.0) -0.090 (-23.2) -0.088 (-21.8) 
∆ Pr(occupational mobility | work exit) -0.091 (-14.8) -0.087 (-13.5) -0.081 (-12.0) -0.070 (-10.1) 
∆ Pr(downward mobility | work exit) -0.046 (-14.2) -0.046 (-13.8) -0.045 (-13.0) -0.041 (-11.6) 
∆ Pr(duration < 6 months | work exit) -0.055   (-8.9) -0.055   (-8.7) -0.054   (-8.5) -0.052   (-8.2) 
∆ Pr(duration < 12 months | work exit) -0.022   (-2.7) -0.022   (-2.6) -0.020   (-2.4) -0.018   (-2.1) 
 West Germany 
∆ r(t) -0.017 (-14.8) -0.016 (-15.1) -0.014 (-15.7) -0.012 (-16.6) 
∆ F(t) -0.017 (-14.8) -0.040 (-13.5) -0.057 (-11.9) -0.065   (-9.5) 
∆ Pr(earnings loss | work exit) 0.013  (+3.1) 0.013  (+3.0) 0.014  (+3.1) 0.014  (+3.2) 
∆ Pr(earnings loss > 20% | work exit) -0.075 (-41.3) -0.080 (-40.2) -0.085 (-38.7) -0.090 (-36.4) 
∆ Pr(occupational mobility | work exit) -0.116 (-26.6) -0.117 (-26.4) -0.117 (-26.1) -0.118 (-25.5) 
∆ Pr(downward mobility | work exit) -0.130 (-47.6) -0.133 (-47.1) -0.136 (-46.2) -0.140 (-45.2) 
∆ Pr(duration < 6 months | work exit) -0.050 (-30.4) -0.053 (-29.3) -0.057 (-27.6) -0.058 (-25.0) 
∆ Pr(duration < 12 months | work exit) 0.005  (+1.1) 0.005  (+1.1) 0.005  (+1.2) 0.006  (+1.3) 
     
Notes: Average discrete-change effects of UI benefit status on unemployment dynamics in the 
estimation samples; proportional levels of change in parantheses; weighted data. 
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Table 6 Heterogeneity in benefit effects, discrete-time bivariate probit rate models 
 Job exit rate Job quality 
Unemployment benefits 
interacted with  
 Any earnings 
loss 
Earnings loss  
> 20% 
Occupational 
mobility 
Downward 
status mobility 
Job duration  
< 6 months 
Job duration  
< 12 months 
 United States 
T  0.022 (.003)**  0.032 (.006)**  0.033 (.006)**  0.024 (.007)**  0.019 (.007)**  0.023 (.007)**  0.017 (.010)* 
Schooling  -0.033 (.006)**  -0.001 (.011)  -0.001 (.012)  0.038 (.012)**  0.036 (.013)**  0.015 (.012)  -0.004 (.016) 
Labor force experience  -1.5e-4 (.001)  0.002 (.002)  -0.001 (.002)  0.001 (.002)  4.3e-4 ( 2e-4)  0.006 (.002)**  0.005 (.003)* 
Tenure in previous job  -1.7e-4 ( 2e-4)  3.2e-5 (4e-4)  -9.1e-5 ( 4e-4)  5.2e-4 ( 5e-4)  -4.7e-4 ( 5e-4)  -0.001 ( 5e-4)**  -0.002 (.001)** 
Earnings in previous job  -0.053 (.014)**  -0.049 (.032)  -0.031 (.034)  -0.055 (.030)*  -0.108 (.029)**  0.028 (.029)  0.115 (.039)** 
Vacancy ratio  -0.008 (.006) - - - - - - 
        
Log-likelihood  -45,353 -45,176 -47,185 -46,577 -39,672 -33,593 
LR-Test against baseline model: χ² 
(df) 
  161.3 (11)**  160.5 (11)**  168.9 (11)**  169.8 (11)**  165.4 (11)**  147.5 (11)** 
 West Germany 
T  -0.007 (.004)*  0.017 (.012)  0.038 (.018)**  0.034 (.018)*  -0.001 (.013)  0.005 (.010)  1.5e-4 (.009) 
Schooling  -0.003 (.026)  -0.003 (.056)  0.051 (.070)  0.116 (.103)  0.116 (.131)  -0.009 (.049)  -0.076 (.043)* 
Labor force experience  0.003 (.006)  0.015 (.015)  0.012 (.019)  -0.045 (.024)*  -0.023 (.026)  -0.007 (.014)  0.007 (.013) 
Tenure in previous job  -0.002 (.001)  -0.014 (.006)**  -0.016 (.006)**  -0.002 (.003)  0.004 (.004)  0.010 (.006)*  0.006 (.003)* 
Earnings in previous job  -0.070 (.094)  -0.370 (.267)  0.147 (.350)  0.204 (.379)  -0.202 (.377)  0.021 (.196)  -0.119 (.174) 
Vacancy ratio  -0.024 (.229) - - - - - - 
        
Log-likelihood  -4,687 -4,441 -3,137 -3,035 -6,293 -6,435 
LR-Test against baseline model: χ² 
(df) 
   19.2 (11)*   24.5 (11)**   19.7 (14)**   11.4 (14)   12.1 (11)   16.8 (11) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. Rate model estimates as obtained from earnings losses model. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993; German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves 
A-M). 
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Figure 1 
Simulated effects of cross-national differences in UI generosity on unemployment dynamics, U.S. sample 
 
 
Notes: Predictions calculated on baseline discrete-time bivariate probit hazard rate model (Table 3); the simulations compare the structure of unemployment 
dynamics under (1) empirical U.S. UI eligibility rules and (2) predicted UI benefit status according to the auxiliary probit regression on German data (cf. 
Appendix 2). 
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1 - U.S. prediction            2 - Prediction applying German benefit rules
 
 
Figure 2 
Simulated effects of cross-national differences in UI generosity on unemployment dynamics, West German sample 
 
 
Notes: Predictions calculated on baseline discrete-time bivariate probit hazard rate model (Table 4); the simulations compare the structure of unemployment 
dynamics under (1) empirical German UI eligibility rules and (2) predicted UI benefit status according to the auxiliary probit regression on U.S. data (cf. 
Appendix 2). 
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 Appendix 1 
Summary statistics for the estimation samples, spell data 
 United States West Germany 
 All workers with UI 
benefits 
without  
UI benefits 
All workers with UI 
benefits 
without  
UI benefits 
Women 0.400 
(0.490) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
0.422 
(0.494) 
0.385 
(0.487) 
0.382 
(0.486) 
0.412 
(0.493) 
Non-white / Non-German 0.184 
(0.387) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
0.189 
(0.391) 
0.118 
(0.322) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
0.135 
(0.342) 
Age 33.05 
(11.68) 
36.96 
(11.23) 
30.35 
(11.11) 
34.99 
(12.21) 
35.62 
(12.32) 
29.75 
(9.84) 
Years of education 12.52 
(1.89) 
12.60 
(1.88) 
12.45 
(1.90) 
10.85 
(2.12) 
10.82 
(2.07) 
11.11 
(2.56) 
Vocational training - - - 0.607 
(0.489) 
0.628 
(0.484) 
0.435 
(0.496) 
Labor force experience 
(years) 
12.76 
(11.31) 
16.60 
(11.38) 
10.32 
(10.56) 
16.02 
(12.38) 
16.82 
(12.48) 
9.43 
(9.26) 
Tenure in previous job 
(months) 
20.56 
(52.51) 
32.79 
(65.93) 
12.78 
(39.86) 
51.38 
(93.25) 
54.25 
(95.87) 
27.67 
(63.06) 
Earnings in previous job 
(1990 US-$, PPP-
adjusted) 
1141.05 
(1131.41) 
1510.13 
(1280.90) 
906.54 
(953.69) 
1554.83 
(758.69) 
1585.90 
(731.61) 
1279.54 
(922.96) 
Occupational status  
(ISEI) 
39.49 
(13.94) 
40.42 
(14.20) 
38.90 
(13.74) 
39.69 
(12.79) 
39.99 
(12.75) 
36.02 
(12.75) 
Vacancy ratio 
(quarterly) 
3.072 
(1.924) 
2.966 
(1.874) 
3.140 
(1.953) 
0.794 
(0.247) 
0.796 
(0.246) 
0.760 
(0.204) 
Unemployment benefits 0.389 
(0.487) 
  0.892 
(0.317) 
  
       
N spells (unweighted) 24,100 8,941 15,159 3,251 2,856 395 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M); weighted data. 
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 Appendix 2 
UI benefit coverage in the United States and West Germany, probit models 
  United States  West Germany 
Intercept   -4.194 (.052)*   -3.983 (.204)* 
Tenure in previous job   0.008 ( 3e-4)*   0.004 (.001)* 
Tenure²   -4.3e-4 ( 3e-6)*   -1.5e-5 ( 6e-6)* 
Tenure³   6.0e-8 ( 5e-9)*   1.7e-8 ( 1e-8)* 
Ln(Previous Earnings)   0.420 (.006)*   0.636 (.028)* 
Women   -0.063 (.046)   0.088 (.109) 
Non-White/German   -0.250 (.012)*   0.070 (.030)* 
Age   0.121 (.005)*   0.053 (.017)* 
Age²   -0.005 ( 3e-4)*   -0.003 (.001)* 
Age³   5.3e-5 ( 4e-6)*   4.4e-5 ( 1e-5)* 
Women x Age   0.008 (.008)   0.022 (.023) 
Women x Age²   -3.9e-4 ( 4e-4)   -0.001 (.001) 
Women x Age³   8.0e-6 ( 6e-6)   2.1e-5 ( 2e-5) 
Education     
- High School / Vocational Training   0.099 (.012)*   0.065 (.031)* 
- Some College / Abitur   0.073 (.014)*   0.056 (.077) 
- Bachelor's degree   -0.089 (.019)*  - 
- Master's degree / University   -0.333 (.026)*   -0.355 (.065)* 
Labor Force Experience   0.022 (.002)*   0.050 (.006)* 
Labor Force Experience²   -3.2e-4 ( 4e-5)*   -0.001 ( 1e-4)* 
Log-likelihood  -49,360  -5,267 
LR-Test (df)  20,821 (32)*  2,419 (31)* 
Pseudo R²  0.174  0.187 
N  86,915  27,135 
Notes:  Standard errors in parantheses; statistical significance at *p<.05. The models additionally 
include seasonal and year dummy variables as additional controls. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M). 
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 Appendix 3 
Calculation of cross-nationally counterfactual unemployment dynamics 
 
The analyses simulating the counterfactual unemployment dynamics for the condition 
that U.S. UI eligibility rules resemble the empirical German rules, and vice versa, 
capitalize on some core identities of event history analyses. In the two competing-
risks, discrete-time setting with incomplete destination space as applied in the 
analyses, let the destination-specific job exit rates rk(t) be given by 
(A1) 2,1),,X,X(),,|,Pr()( 12212 =Φ=≥=== ktTBXkDtTtrk ρ . 
Then, by virtue of basic survival analysis theory (cf. Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; 
Tuma and Hannan 1984; Lancaster 1990; Petersen 1995; Allison 1982), the 
aggregate cumulated pseudo-survivor function G*(t) relating to the pseudo-duration 
distribution of work exits from unemployment in the sample is given by 
(A2) ∏ ∑ 





−=
t k
k trtG )(1)(
* , with 
(A3) )(1)( ** tGtF −=  
as the cumulated pseudo-distribution function. Repeating the calculation separately 
by job quality type k gives the relative proportion of job exits into employment of type 
k from 
(A4) )(/)()|Pr( ** tFtFtTkD k=≤= . 
To arrive at the counterfactual prediction, actual individual benefit status B has been 
replaced with a counterfactual individual benefit status B* as predicted by the other 
countrys auxiliary probit regression given in Appendix 2, and the calculations have 
been run accordingly. In fact, the same method has been applied to arrive at the 
marginal benefit effects as given in Table 5, with the only difference being that benefit 
status has been varied between benefit coverage and non-coverage, independently 
of actual benefit status B. 
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